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THE AVAILABILITY OF A TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE FOR STATE
LEGISLATORS: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S CURRENT POSITION
United States v. Craig,
528 F.2d 773, rev'd on rehearing, 537 F.2d 957
(7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3416
(U.S. Dec. 7, 1976) (No. 76-179)
On December 4, 1974 three members of the Illinois House of Represent-
atives were indicted by a federal grand jury on two charges of political
corruption. I One of the defendants claimed that statements which he had
given to federal officials were inadmissible because they concerned the
motivations behind his legislative activities and were therefore protected by
the speech or debate clauses of both the Illinois2 and federal 3 constitutions.
Although Congressmen increasingly have invoked the federal speech or
debate clauses as a protective shield from criminal and civil liability premised
upon their legislative activities, 4 until United States v. Craig5 a state
legislator had never claimed the protections of these clauses in a federal
criminal proceeding.
Therefore, in Craig the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was
presented with a case of first impression. The specific issue addressed was
whether a state legislator's statements concerning his official acts were
admissible in a federal criminal prosecution. At the first appellate hearing the
court held that although neither the federal nor Illinois speech or debate
clauses applied in the federal trial of a state legislator, a common law speech
or debate privilege did exist to preclude admissibility of the controverted
statements.6 At the rehearing the en banc court agreed with the panel's
determination that neither the Illinois nor federal clauses were applicable but
reversed on the ground that no common law speech or debate privilege either
I. The defendants were charged with violating the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970),
and the Mail Fraud Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
2. The Illinois clause provides: "A member of the [General Assembly] shall not be held to
answer before any other tribunal for any speech or debate, written or oral, in either house." ILL.
CONST. art. 4, § 12.
3. The federal clause provides: "[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, they
[Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.'"U.S. CONST. art. 1, §
6, cl. 1.
4. See text accompanying notes 22-53 infra.
5. 528 F.2d 773, rev'd on rehearing, 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 45
U.S.L.W. 3416 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976) (No. 76-179).
6. 528 F.2d 773, 779 (7th Cir. 1976).
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existed or should be created for the benefit of state legislators in federal
criminal trials.7
The importance of Craig lies not only in the evidentiary tool provided to
federal prosecutors in cases of local political corruption but also in the
Seventh Circuit's contribution to a clearer understanding of the concepts of
official immunity and testimonial privilege. By precisely articulating a
distinction between the scope of official immunity and the availability of
testimonial privileges, Craig offers a mode of analysis which alleviates
confusion when the two concepts become intertwined as defenses in sensitive
political cases. In essence, the court in Craig refused to conclude that the
political status of an individual automatically creates the existence of a
testimonial privilege absent a corresponding immunity from liability.
However, by concluding that no privilege existed independent of a
corresponding immunity from liability, the court in Craig failed to acknowl-
edge the Illinois constitutional mandate that its legislators be protected when
exercising their legislative duties. It is the thesis of this comment that
although Craig may be legally sound in concluding that no common law
testimonial privilege exists independent of an immunity from liability, as a
matter of policy serious questions are raised concerning the extent of federal
intrusion into local legislative matters.
This comment will analyze the reasoning of Craig in order to explain the
court's final determination that no common law speech or debate privilege
exists for state legislators in federal criminal proceedings. To that end it will
be necessary to review the nature of the speech or debate clause as revealed
through United States Supreme Court decisions, the limitations of official
immunity for state legislators faced with criminal liability in the federal
courts, and the rules by which the federal courts determine whether the
common law warrants recognition of an asserted testimonial privilege in
criminal cases. The two Craig opinions will then be analyzed by stressing not
only the distinction between privilege and immunity but the policy issues
raised by this decision. Before reviewing the legal precedents to Craig, the
factual circumstances surrounding the grand jury indictment and the pro-
cedural development which ultimately brought the case to the appellate court
must first be discussed.
THE HISTORY OF THE CRAIG LITIGATION
The three Illinois legislators were charged with violating the Hobbs Act8
7. 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
8. The Hobbs Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person
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and the Mail Fraud Statute. 9 Count One charged that the defendants and an
unindicted party conspired to extort $1500 from the Illinois Car and Truck
Renting and Leasing Association through the lobbyist of this group by using
their power as state legislators. 10 Count Two charged that the three legislators
entered into a scheme whereby they introduced a bill detrimental to the auto
and truck leasing business' I and then proceeded to table the bill in a House of
Representatives committee12 in return for the $1500 which was mailed to the
lobbyist by a corporate member of the association. 13
During the course of a special grand jury investigation into corrupt
practices within the Illinois legislature, 14 one of the Craig defendants, Louis
Markert, had given statements to an assistant United States Attorney, postal
inspectors, and the grand jury pertaining to the history and motives behind the
controversial house bill. 15 Following the indictment, Markert and another
defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the indictment was barred
by both the Illinois and federal speech or debate clauses. The district court
judge denied the motion and ruled that the legislators were subject to criminal
liability regardless of speech or debate protections.
16
Markert also filed a motion to suppress the controverted statements,
claiming they were taken in violation of the federal and Illinois speech or
debate clauses. The district court judge granted the motion to suppress and
ruled that the Illinois clause did provide the defendants with a speech or
debate privilege. 17 He requested that Markert identify which statements
or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this
section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years,
or both.
(b)(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with his
consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or
under color of official right.
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (a)-(b)(2) (1970) (emphasis added).
9. The Mail Fraud Statute provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representa-
tions, or promises, . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or
attempting so to do, . . . knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the
direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to
whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing . ...
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970) (emphasis added).
10. Indictment, Count 1, No. 5, United States v. Craig, 74 CR 877 (N.D. Ill., returned, Dec.
4, 1974).
11. Indictment, Count 2, No. 4, id.
12. The defendants allegedly caused consideration of the bill to be postponed in the Motor
Vehicles Division of the House Transportation Committee. Indictment, Count 2, No. 5, id.
13. Indictment, Count 2, No. 9, id.
14. 528 F.2d at 774.
15. Markert was informed of his fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination but
chose to answer all questions. Id.
16. United States v. Craig, No. 74 CR 877 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 1975) (mem.).
17. United States v. Craig, No. 74 CR 877 (N.D. Il. Mar. 17, 1975) (order granting
motion to suppress).
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violated this privilege and Markert accordingly filed a statement identifying
the conversations he considered protected. In response the government
claimed that Markert had no testimonial privilege and added in the alternative
that if the court found a privilege, Markert had waived it by giving the
statements. 18 The judge upheld the applicability of the Illinois clause and the
government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and
requested that the order of suppression be reversed and the case remanded for
trial.
Because Markert had not appealed the district court's determination that
he was subject to liability for the substantive crimes, the appellate court only
had to resolve the question of whether the Federal Rules of Evidence
warranted recognition of a speech or debate privilege protecting Markert's
disclosure of criminal conduct committed by him in the course of his
legislative activities. Since the federal clause does not include state legislators
within the scope of its protection, 19 it was not applicable to state legislators.
Similarly, although the Illinois clause protected Markert in a state court, 20 in
federal criminal trials the federal courts apply the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. 21 Therefore, the issue evolved into a determination of whether federal
common law required recognition of a privilege for state legislators. An
examination of the legal guidelines by which the court resolved this issue is
necessary to understand the final disposition of the case.
SOURCES DETERMINATIVE OF A SPEECH OR DEBATE PRIVILEGE
The Nature of the Federal Clause
Although the federal speech or debate clause does not include state
legislators within its coverage, understanding the nature of the federal clause
assists in determining the propriety of extending its protections to state
legislators indicted at the federal level. The federal clause provides congress-
men with both an immunity and a privilege: immunity from civil and criminal
liability for legislative activities and a testimonial privilege against disclosure
18. The issue of whether a state legislator can waive a speech or debate privilege was not
pertinent to a determination of the existence of a testimonial privilege for state legislators and will
not be analyzed in this comment. For discussion of whether Markert might have waived the
privilege, had one existed, see United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 780-81 (7th Cir. 1976)
(majority- opinion).
19. The federal speech or debate clause is contained within the Constitutional provision
pertaining to the compensation and privileges of "Senators and Representatives" of Congress.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cls. 1, 2.
20. To date public officials in Illinois have raised the clause only as a bar to civil liability.
See Arlington Heights Nat'l Bank v. Arlington Heights Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 37 I11. 2d 546,
229 N.E.2d 574 (1967) (village officials absolutely privileged from investigation for zoning
ruling); Phillips v. Brown, 270 I11. 450, 110 N.E. 601 (1916) (members of assembly subject to
service of process in trespass action); Larson v. Doner, 32 111. App. 2d 971,178 N.E.2d 399 (1962)
(city officials immune from slander suit based on contents of official resolution).
21. See text accompanying notes 76-84 infra.
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of the motivations and conduct underlying legislative activities. However, the
two aspects of the clause do not function independently. The United States
Supreme Court cases reveal that while Congressmen have continually in-
voked the clause as a source of civil and criminal immunity, the testimonial
privilege arises only as an evidentiary defense in furtherance of an immunity
claim.
22
In this sense the United States clause differs from its British counterpart.
In the developing years of Britain's parliamentary system "privileges" were
bought and sold as protective devices whereby citizens could exert their
independence from the Crown. 23 The distinction at first glance appears
irrelevant since the end result is a protection to both legislators and members
of Parliament in the exercise of their official duties. However, since the court
in Craig was required to examine the common law in determining the
existence of a testimonial privilege for state legislators, it is important to
clarify the nature of the United States constitutional clause by focusing on the
protections it provides within the United States judicial system. A brief
examination of the United States Supreme Court interpretations of the federal
clause illustrate the extent to which the testimonial privilege is connected with
the invocation of an immunity claim.
The privilege issue has not arisen in civil suits against individual
congressmen because the Congressmen in these cases have been concerned
only with establishing their immunity from civil liability. For example, in
Kilbourne v. Thompson ,24 the earliest United States Supreme Court interpre-
tation of the federal clause, members of the House of Representatives claimed
immunity under the clause when a private citizen brought suit for false
imprisonment against individual House members. The plaintiff claimed his
arrest resulted from a House vote erroneously charging him with contempt.
25
While the Court held the individual members immune from liability the
plaintiff ultimately obtained relief from ministerial House functionaries. 26
22. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan,
412 U.S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408
U.S. 501 (1971); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S.
82 (1967); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951); Kilbourne v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
23. Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARv. L.
REV. 1113, 1137 n. 128 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Reinstein & Silverglate]. For other comprehen-
sive reviews of the evolution of English free speech or debate guarantees see Celia, The Doctrine
of Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech and Debate: Its Past, Present and Future as a Barto
Criminal Prosecutions in the Courts, 2 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1-18 (1968); Comment, The Bribed
Congressman's Immunity From Prosecution, 75 YALE L.J. 335, 336-341 (1965).
24. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
25. Id. at 181.
26. Id. at 200-05. The Court held that the House sergeant-at-arms was subject to liability
for false imprisonment since he executed the House resolution ordering the arrest and imprison-
ment. Id. at 205.
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This pattern of finding Congressmen immune from civil liability per-
vades subsequent Court rulings. At times plaintiffs have been able to maintain
a civil suit against lesser legislative functionaries but the consistency with
which the Court has protected Congressmen illustrates the absolute nature of
civil immunity provided by the clause. Thus, in Dombrowski v. Eastland,27
the chairman of a Senate subcommittee was immune from suit by private
citizens claiming his investigatory activities violated their civil rights. In
Powell v. McCormack2 8 representative-elect Powell was unable to maintain
an action for declaratory relief against individual members of the House who
adopted a resolution denying him his seat. However, the Court held that since
House employees had also been named as defendants, the federal courts had
jurisdiction to review the House vote excluding Powell.2 9 In Doe v. McMil-
lan30 parents of school children in the District of Columbia were prohibited
from suing individual Congressmen for invasion of privacy when the congres-
sional committee issued a report on the District of Columbia school system
and cast certain identified school children in an unfavorable light.31 As in
Powell and Kilbourne, the parents were able to maintain suit against the
legislative employees who had distributed the report. 32 Finally, in Eastland v.
United States Servicemen's Fund33 the Court held that a Senate subcommittee
could not be enjoined from subpoenaing the bank records of the Servicemen's
Fund and ruled that this action would intrude upon the legislative activities of
the investigating committee.
34
To date only one United States Supreme Court case has interpreted the
extent to which speech or debate clause immunity applies when a civil claim
under federal law is brought against state legislators for their legislative acts.
In Tenney v. Brandhove35 a California citizen filed suit against members of
the California legislature, claiming that the committee members deprived him
of his civil rights by urging local prosecutors to institute contempt proceed-
27. 387 U.S. 82 (1967). The Court did hold that a subcommittee counsel would not enjoy the
same immunities afforded the Congressmen. Id. at 85.
28. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
29. Id. at 506.
30. 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
31. Id. at 308 n.1.
32. Id. at 315.
33. 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
34. The Court examined whether the investigatory activities of the committee were "an
integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which members participate in
committee and House proceedings." Id. at 504, (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606,
625 (1972)).
35. 341 U.S. 367 (1951). See also Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1 (1808), wherein the court held
that the Massachusetts constitutional provision similar to the federal speech or debate clause
provided state legislators With protection from executive and judicial interference in legislative
discussion. However, the court found the defendant legislator liable in a slander suit as speaking
outside his official capacity, although the remarks were delivered on the house floor. Id. at 30.
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ings when he refused to testify at a committee hearing. 36 Although the
California constitution did not have a speech or debate clause, 37 the Court
held that the legislators were immune from civil liability by relying upon the
immunities provided by the history of the federal clause 38 and the correspond-
ing concern for legislative immunity which other states had expressed by
enacting speech or debate clauses. 39 Tenney was an important precedent in
resolving the Craig dilemma but the Court in Tenney did not discuss the
privilege against disclosure in a criminal case. Instead the court only
considered the extent of legislative immunity in a civil rights suit.n° Even at
that juncture the Court was careful to add that legislative "privilege" 41
deserved greater respect in a suit against the legislature than when "the
legislature seeks the affirmative aid of the courts to assert a privilege. '42
When individual Congressmen have been indicted and the charge has
encompassed acts performed under the guise of their official status, the
defendants have raised the federal clause as a source of both absolute
immunity from criminal liability and testimonial privilege. In three key
cases43 the Court first determined whether the allegedly criminal conduct was
within the scope of the immunity and only then determined if a privilege
against disclosure was also operative.
In the first of these cases, United States v. Johnson,4 a member of the
House was indicted on seven counts of conflict of interest and one count of
conspiracy to defraud. 45 The Court set aside the conviction of conspiracy
because it was based upon the allegation that Johnson had delivered a speech
36. The plaintiff had circulated a petition within the legislature urging that no further funds
be appropriated to a committee investigating allegedly un-American activities. The committee in
turn summoned the plaintiff to a hearing which he contended was unrelated to any legislative
purpose. Tenney v. Brendhove, 341 U.S. 367, 370-71 (1951).
37. Id. at 375 n.5.
38. "The privilege of legislators to be free from arrest or civil process for what they do or
say in legislative proceedings has taproots in the Parliamentary struggles of the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries." Id. at 372.
39. Id. at 374-75.
40. "We conclude only that here the individual defendants and the legislative committee
were acting in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act, and that the statute of 1871
[The Klu Klux Klan Act, Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)] does not create civil liability for such conduct." Id. at 379.
41. The Court continually referred to the protections of speech or debate clauses as
"privileges", whether discussing immunity from arrest or civil process, 341 U.S. at 372; freedom
to speak or act, id. at 375; or the provision in its entirety, id. at 376. Although the semantical
distinction between privileges and immunities may seem unimportant when determining the
scope of protection afforded legislative committee members in civil rights suits, in a criminal case
the state legislator might assert the availability of a testimonial privilege premised upon speech or
debate clause protection independently from a claim of criminal immunity, as in Craig, and the
language of Tenney does not offer clear guidelines.
42. Id. at 378.
43. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501
(1971); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
44. 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
45. Id. at 170-71.
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on the floor of the House, which was favorable to certain savings and loan
institutions, for personal gain.46 The Court then ruled that Johnson's state-
ments at trial pertaining to the motives and construction of the speech were
therefore privileged against disclosure. 4
7 In Gravel v. United States,48
Senator Gravel's aide was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury inves-
tigating criminal conduct surrounding the republication of the Pentagon
Papers in manuscript form by Beacon Press, a Boston publishing house.
When Senator Gravel moved to quash the subpoena on the ground that the
federal speech or debate clause prohibited disclosure of legislative activities,
the Court looked to the scope of the allegedly criminal conduct and then
denied the availability of the privilege. 49 The Court reasoned that since
republication in an independent press was beyond the scope of immunity
afforded by the clause, there was no privilege against disclosure of the
circumstances of this act. 50 In United States v. Brewster51 the Court only
reached the issue of criminal liability and significantly narrowed the protec-
tion of the clause in criminal cases by sustaining an indictment charging
Senator Brewster with bribery. The Court held that "taking a bribe is,
obviously, no part of the legislative process. ,'52 Although at first glance
Brewster seems dispositive of Craig, in Brewster the elements of proof did
not include any admissions by the Senator concerning acts on the Senate
floor.
53
This review has emphasized the nature of the immunities and privileges
46. The government claimed that Johnson had read the speech in furtherance of a plan to
procure the dismissal of pending indictments of a Maryland savings and loan institution on mail
fraud charges. Id. at 171-72.
47. The Court strongly disapproved of the government's lengthy questioning of Johnson at
trial concerning the motives, construction, and delivery of the speech and quoted extensively
from the direct examination. Id. at 173-77 & nn.4 & 5.
48. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
49. The Court reasoned, "It is, therefore, sufficiently plain that the constitutional freedom
from arrest does not exempt Members of Congress from the operation of the ordinary criminal
laws, even though imprisonment may prevent or interfere with the performance of their duties as
Members." Id. at 616. For criticism of this decision, emphasizing the importance of the
informing function of congressmen, see Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 23, at 1148-57.
50. 408 U.S. at 623-27. The Court distinguished the republication of the Pentagon Papers
from the publication of this document in the legislative record pertaining to the committee
meeting, noting, "[P]rivate publication by Senator Gravel through the cooperation of Beacon
Press was in no way essential to the deliberations of the Senate . Id. at 626.
51. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
52. Id. at 527. For reliance upon this statement in concluding that Markert, subject to
criminal liability, could not claim a corresponding testimonial privilege as a state legislator, see
United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 783-84 (7th Cir. 1976), and text accompanying notes 111-12
infra.
53. In relying upon Johnson for holding that Senator Brewster was not immune from
criminal liability for taking the bribe, the Court recognized that proof of the bribery charge "does
not draw in question the legislative acts of the defendant member of Congress or his motives for
performing them." 408 U.S. at 527 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 185 (1966)).
Arguably then, if the court in Craig had ultimately found Markert immune from criminal liability,
the statements would have been privileged.
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conferred by the federal clause in civil and criminal suits but has not discussed
the rationales necessitating the inclusions of the clause in the Constitution. As
the review of the Craig decision will show, 54 diverse opinions on the purpose
of the clause have led to differing conclusions as to the existence of a privilege
for state legislators. The United States Supreme Court cases do reveal that the
clause provides a two-pronged protection: where there is an immunity
congressmen have also enjoyed a testimonial privilege. Since state legislators
are not covered by the federal clause, the extent to which the common law
doctrine of official immunity provides protections similar to those of the
federal clause should be examined.
Local Public Officials in Federal Court:
Scope of Official Immunity
In determining the protections which state legislators enjoy in federal
criminal cases, the analysis again centers on examining the extent to which
the doctrine of official immunity protects state legislators from liability for
their legislative acts and whether a testimonial privilege therefore arises in
federal criminal proceedings. Case law reveals that the same broad protec-
tions which shield Congressmen are not available to state legislators in the
federal courts.
With respect to criminal liability, it is clear that state legislators are not
immune from prosecution although the charges encompass legislatively
related acts. Both Illinois and federal statutes, such as the Illinois Corrupt
Practices Act55 and the Mail Fraud Statute, 56 clearly indicate a growing trend
to provide statutory sanctions for political corruption. 57 The increasing
plethora of convictions of public officials also illustrates that public office has
not proved to be a shield from criminal liability. 58 For example, in the recent
Seventh Circuit case of United States v. Keane,59 a Chicago alderman was
indicted and convicted of mail fraud and conspiracy. The defendant had
allegedly used his political position first to obtain property at scavenger tax
sales which he knew would be the site of urban renewal, then to recommend
that the city council clear the tax liens, and finally to induce various city
54. See text accompanying notes 85-119 infra.
55. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, §§ 1-4.2 (1975). For other Illinois statutes sanctioning legislative
misconduct, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 33-3 (1975); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §§601-602 (1975)
(Illinois Governmental Ethics Act).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
57. Thornburgh, Preface, 64 GEO. L.J. 173, 173-77 (1975). In his introduction to the 1975
circuit note, Assistant Attorney General Thornburgh commented on the ramifications of these
statutes in federal prosecutions of local officials.
58. For a review of recent Seventh Circuit political corruption cases, see Note, The Travel
Act: Its Limitation by the Seventh Circuit Within the Context of Local Political Corruption, 52
CHI.-KEr L. REV. 503 n.3 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Travel Act].
59. 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3532 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1976) (No.
75-867).
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departments to purchase the property which he had acquired. 6° The acts
forming the substance of the indictments were clearly related to the alder-
man's official duties and yet this factor did not protect the alderman from
criminal liability in the federal court. In fact, he did not raise immunity as a
defense. In the Seventh Circuit alone, Keane is merely illustrative of a series
of convictions of aldermen, police officers, and judges for extortion, conspir-
acy, and other forms of political corruption involving abuse of public office.
6'
Other circuits also provide analogous cases in which the indictment
specifically included official acts as an element of the substantive crime. In
Braatelien v. United States62 a federal judge was convicted for conspiracy to
defraud when he adjudicated cases in a light favorable to defendants who had
provided a fee for the favorable decision. 63 In United States v. Anzelmo 64 the
Attorney General of Louisiana was indicted under the Mail Fraud Statute
65
when he directly participated in the activities of a company for whom he
issued favorable opinions. In the latter case the defendant argued that public
officials were immune from criminal prosecutions stemming from an official
act. The court, however, maintained that public officials could be prosecuted
for both malfeasance and corruption and that it was unnecessary that the
indictment limit the charges to allegations of corruption. 66 These cases reveal
that when the officials were not immune from liability, evidence of the
official act was admissible as proof.
In contrast to these criminal suits, in civil litigation the federal courts
have consistently recognized that local officials are afforded either absolute or
qualified immunity. Landmark United States Supreme Court decisions such
as Tenney, Wood v. Striktland,67 Scheur v. Rhodes ,68 Pierson v. Ray,69 and
60. 522 F.2d at 538-44. See also City of Chicago ex rel. Cohen v. Keane, No. 48297 (II1. Sup.
Ct., filed Sept. 20, 1976) (granting Chicago resident standing to sue for accounting for all profits
made by Alderman Keane from the property transactions forming the substance of the indict-
ments in the federal criminal proceedings).
61. The Travel Act, supra note 58, at 511-16. The special grand jury investigation resulting
in the indictments of the three Illinois legislators in Craig yielded three other indictments of
Illinois legislators. Brief for Appellant at 2 n.l, United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773 (7th Cir.
1976).
62. 147 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1945).
63. Id. at 889-90. Accord, U.S. v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1938) (judge guilty of
bribery when receiving payment for rendering correct decision); Cook v. Bangs, 31 F. 640, 642
(C.C.D. Minn. 1887) (dictum) (A judge "is just as amenable to the criminal law as any private
citizen." 31 F. at 642.).
64. 319 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D. La. 1970).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
66. 319 F. Supp. at 1119. However, the court also noted that if the indictment had only
charged the Attorney General with issuing erroneous opinions he "might have made a stronger
case for immunity." Id.
67. 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (articulating test of qualified immunity for local school board
officials).
68. 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (qualified immunity for governor and other public officers).
69. 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (absolute immunity for judges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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the recent case of Imbler v. Pachtman ,70 reveal a consistent concern that local
officials enjoy some measure of immunity from civil claims premised upon
exercise of a discretionary duty. 71 Nevertheless, even in civil litigation the
federal courts have not universally refrained from intruding upon the ac-
tivities of local governmental units. Three civil suits seeking injunctions
against state legislatures 72 illustrate that the doctrine of official immunity does
not prohibit injunctive relief when constitutional rights are clearly threatened.
In Jordan v. Hutcheson73 three black lawyers claiming that a Virginia
legislative committee was harrassing them in their efforts to litigate racial
discrimination in the Virginia courts were awarded injunctive relief. In Bond
v. Floyd74 the Court held that the Georgia legislature could be enjoined from
continuing to deny duly-elected Julian Bond his seat on the basis of anti-war
statements made during the course of the political campaign. In Bush v. New
Orleans Parish School Board75 the district court enjoined the Louisiana
legislature from thwarting the school board's efforts to comply with desegre-
gation orders. In each of these cases the activity enjoined was legislative in
nature and yet the courts manifested none of the reluctance which the United
States Supreme Court has shown in injunction actions against Congress.
Thus, case law reveals that although the doctrine of official immunity
continues to provide state legislators with immunity from civil liability, when
individual local officials are charged with political corruption premised upon
abuse of office, there is no immunity from criminal liability. Further, as
Keane illustrates, the official act is often a central element of the indictment
and evidence of the illegal official act is admissible. Even in civil suits the
federal courts have not found that state legislatures are immune from
injunctions as is Congress. Therefore, in determining whether a common law
testimonial privilege exists for state legislators, it can be seen that the federal
courts have not granted these officials the same deference accorded congress-
men under the federal speech or debate clause.
70. 424 U.S. 409 (1975) (absolute immunity for state prosecuting attorney under 42 U.S.C. §
1983).
71. See, e.g., Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973) (civil immunity for state
legislators in suit by female law student allegedly denied employment as page because she was
female); Gambocz v. Sub-Committee on Claims, 423 F.2d 674 (3d Cir. 1970) (members of
sub-committee immune in suit by mayoral candiate claiming deprivation of rights in election
contest). But see Saffioti v. Wilson, 392 F. Supp. 1335 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (governor's exercise of
the veto power over private bill may be reviewed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
72. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1963);
Bush v. New Orleans Parish School Bd., 191 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. La.), aff'd sub nom. Denny v.
Bush, 367 U.S. 908 (1961).
73. 323 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1963).
74. 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
75. 191 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. La.), aff'd sub nom. Denny v. Bush, 367 U.S. 908 (1961).
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Regardless of the limitations imposed upon state legislators claiming
immunity from criminal liability, the fact remains that under the Federal
Rules of Evidence the federal courts are free to fashion testimonial privileges
in criminal cases. Therefore, a brief examination of the federal rules pertain-
ing to testimonial privilege will clarify the framework within which the court
in Craig attempted to resolve Markert's claim.
Federal Rule 501: Option to Create a Privilege
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure76 provides that the
admissibility of a witness' testimony shall be governed by congressional
acts, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules which the United States
Supreme Court may adopt. The Advisory Committee notes specifically state
that in criminal cases the federal courts "are not bound by the State law of
evidence. '" ' Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence78 addresses the
privilege issue and provides that in the absence of an act of Congress or United
States Supreme Court ruling, privileges "shall be governed by the common
law" as the federal courts so interpret "in the light of reason and
experience. "
7 9
The effect of rule 501, when read in conjunction with rule 26, is to give
federal courts discretionary power when considering whether an asserted
privilege warrants recognition in the particular criminal case. The United
States Supreme Court Advisory Committee's draft of rule 501 enumerated
nine specific privileges, 80 but when this draft was submitted to Congress,
concern was voiced that the exclusion of other privileges would abrogate the
scope of protection developed in the common law. 81 As a result the rule
76. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26 provides: "In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken
orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by an Act of Congress or by these rules, the
Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court."
77. Compare Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. § 26 (as amended 1975)
Advisory Committee Notes 1 with FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a), prescribing partial conformity to state
law in the taking of testimony.
78. FED. R. EVID. 501 [hereinafter cited in the text as rule 501] provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law.
79. For a review of the federal case law and statutory revisions resulting in the "reason and
experience" approach, see United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 775-76 (7th Cir. 1976).
80. 56 F.R.D. 183, 234-56 (required reports, lawyer-client psychotherapist-patient,
husband-wife, communications to clergymen, political vote at political elections, trade secrets,
secrets of state and other official information, and identity of informer).
81. S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1974, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7051, 7058.
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ultimately adopted provided a more flexible format for judicial resolution of
privilege claims.
Therefore, the federal courts continue to evaluate whether the particular
privilege asserted, such as the doctor-patient, husband-wife, or attorney-
client protections, would result in the exclusion of useful testimony in the
federal trial.82 The difficulty inherent in this flexible approach is that a federal
court's determination may contradict the evidentiary rules of the states which
have promulgated by statute or case law a privilege in furtherance of some
extrinsic policy. 83 A strong argument can be made that if the defendant has
become accustomed to operating under the protections of a state-created
privilege, the federal court's exclusion of this privilege results in an inconsist-
ency and defeats the defendant's expectations of protection. 
84
The difficulty which the court in Craig encountered in determining
whether a testimonial privilege applied to Markert's case was that in no other
federal criminal proceeding had a state legislator invoked the protections of
either a state speech or debate privilege or the federal clause. In view of the
United States Supreme Court delineations of the two-pronged nature of the
clause, the limited official immunity which local public officials have
enjoyed in federal criminal court, and the discretionary guidelines of rule 501,
the Seventh Circuit was presented with the option of determining for the first
time whether or not a state legislator does indeed enjoy this testimonial
privilege.
THE CRAIG DECISION
A Review of the Opinions
At the first hearing the court was sharply divided as to whether a
testimonial privilege existed. The majority held that a common law testimo-
nial privilege existed but that Markert had waived it by testifying. The
concurring opinion agreed that the motion to suppress should be denied but
contended that no testimonial privilege was available to state legislators in
federal criminal cases. A review of these opinions illustrates how two judges
82. See, e.g., United States v. Mancuso, 444 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1971) (common law
physician-patient privilege inapplicable in Mail Fraud case); United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d
1317 (5th Cir. 1970) (en banc), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 933 (1971) (state attorney-client privilege
rejected in federal criminal proceeding); contra, Love v. United States, 386 F.2d 260 (8th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 985 (1968) (state attorney-client privilege binding in federal court);
Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960) (state attorney-client privilege governing in federal
tax proceeding).
83. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS ch. 10, § 94, at 414 (2d ed. 1970).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Tratner, 511 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1975), a federal tax proceeding
wherein the court found the circuits divided on whether the attorney-client privilege is resolved
by federal or state law. The court looked to common law, finding that it was unnecessary to
determine which particular law applies as in the case at bar the result was the same under either
standard. Id. at 251. See also Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in
Federal Courts Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 122-24 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Louisell].
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can arrive at opposite conclusions by premising their analyses upon distinct
authoritative guidelines.
The majority opinion began with the premise that rule 501 provided the
court with the opportunity to fashion a common law speech or debate
privilege.8 5 By beginning its analysis with rule 501, the majority appeared to
be rejecting Markert's claim that the Illinois speech or debate clause was
applicable in the federal proceeding. 86 In stressing the great flexibility which
rule 501 provides in resolving privilege issues, the majority reached back to
the Rules of Decision Act of 1789,87 at which time the federal courts looked to
state law for procedural rules. The majority then traced the statutory and case
law development of rule 50188 and pointed out that the federal courts were
continually given wider latitude to fashion evidentiary rules independently.
89
The majority recalled the difficulties which Congress encountered when
the original proposal of rule 501 enumerated specific privileges and con-
cluded that since these enumerated privileges were eventually discarded in
favor of the present flexible rule, Congress did not intend to limit the common
law privilege of both the federal and state speech or debate clauses. 9°
The difficulty which an analysis premised upon rule 501 presents is that
once the court so vociferously emphasizes its freedom to accept or reject a
privilege claim, the floodgates are opened for considering a broad spectrum of
legal and policy considerations. In a sensitive case, such as Craig, where the
real issue centered on the ability of federal courts to intrude upon a state
legislator's domain, it was inevitable that once the majority concluded that it
could fashion a protection, it would hesitate to contradict the precedents set by
the United States Supreme Court with respect to the federal clause.
Therefore, the majority proceeded to consider the common law history
of the speech or debate clause, noting the existence of this privilege in 17th
century Parliamentary struggles and emphasizing the Constitutional Conven-
85. 528 F.2d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 1976).
86. The court noted, "The primary question is whether state legislators have a Speech or
Debate privilege, conferred either by the Illinois Constitution or as a matter of federal common
law .... " Id. at 775. However, without further discussion of this issue, the court proceeded to
analyze the nature of rule 501.
87. Rules of Decision Act, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1970)).
88. 528 F.2d at 775-76.
89. Id. Compare United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, (12 How.) 383 (1851) (state law of
1789 determined admissibility of witness's testimony in federal court), and Logan v. United
States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892) (state law at time of admission to Union controls in federal criminal
trials) with Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325 (1892) (federal courts may examine state laws
of evidence in the light of general authority) and Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933)
(federal courts may modify or disregard local laws of privilege). See also Rosen v. United
States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918); Wolfle v. United States. 291 U.S. 7 (1933).
90. 528 F.2d at 776. However, the Advisory Committee's proposals for rule 501, wherein
the nine enumerated privileges originally appeared, did not include the speech or debate clause.
See 56 F.R.D. at 230-34.
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tion's adoption of this protection. 9 The majority considered the United States
Supreme Court interpretations of the federal clause and drew on these cases
not for a distinction between immunity from liability and privilege against
disclosure but for the broader principle that the clause provides congressmen
with extensive protection in exercising their legislative duties. 92 Brief ac-
knowledgment was paid to the immunity and privilege distinction inherent in
the nature of the clause, but the majority reasoned, citing United States v.
Johnson,93 that the purposes of these two aspects are essentially the same:
"preservation of the independence of the legislature. "9
The court then turned to a consideration of the important role of the states
in the "American system of government' 95 and at this point mentioned the
Founding Fathers' concern that the states remain "an important unit of the
government. "96 This discussion of the role of the states reveals the broad
scope which the opinion had taken at this point. By making general statements
regarding the national government engulfing the states, the importance of the
tenth amendment, "the essence" of the federal structure of government, and
the "vital" function of the state legislature, 97 the majority was not so much
analyzing these concepts as articulating an awareness of the political over-
tones of Craig. The majority acknowledged the government's contention that
the purpose of the federal clause was to provide Congress with protection
from a co-equal branch of the federal government but rejected the govern-
ment's conclusions that this separation of powers policy did not apply in
federal indictments of state legislators. In rejecting this contention, the
majority again stressed that such an analysis "ignores the federal nature of the
American system of government. "98
This same concern for state independence permeated the majority's
consideration of policy reasons mandating a protection for state legislators.
The majority's main concern was the deterrent effect which the lack of
testimonial privilege would have on state legislators, noting the government's
concession at oral argument that denying a privilege would inhibit state
legislators in their legislative conduct. 9 The majority further broadened the
scope of the opinion by observing that first amendment protections would not
91. 528 F.2d at 776-77.
92. Id. at 777.
93. 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
94. 528 F.2d at 778.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing II ELLIOT'S DEBATES 168, 199 (1836 ed.) and THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (New
Am. Lib. Ed. 1961)).
97. 528 F.2d at 777-78.
98. Id. at 778.
99. Id. The Government attempted to qualify this concession at the en banc rehearing by
explaining that denying a speech or debate privilege would hopefully only deter state legislators
from engaging in criminal conduct. Brief for Appellant at 13 n.28,537 F.2d 957(7th Cir. 1976) (en
banc).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
adequately cover the state legislator's statements in a situation involving
admission of testimony.100
Finally, the majority called attention to "principles of federal-state
comity" 101 by citing Younger v. Harris0 2 and Tenney for the proposition
that regulation of state legislative abuses should be monitored at the local
level. The majority perhaps somewhat idealistically suggested that local
political corruption should primarily be curtailed in the state courts, "the
political unit most directly involved." 03 In support of its overriding concern
for deference to state legislative independence, the majority even suggested
that "it is better to tolerate the potential abuses ' 1°4 than to unduly interfere
with a legislator's official activities.
Once the majority premised its analysis upon the language of rule 501,
the common law history of the speech or debate clause and the nature of our
federal government, the wide range of policy considerations supporting state
legislative independence all weighed heavily upon the court and led to the
creation of a common law testimonial privilege. Although the opinion began
with a rule of evidence, the issue became so dominated by complex govern-
mental function concerns that the court felt compelled to grant the privilege.
As a review of the concurring opinion reveals, when the analysis is begun by
determining the extent of Markert's immunity from criminal liability, the
focus is shifted from consideration of the complex nature of state legislative
independence to the practical problem of resolving exactly when a testimonial
privilege arises for public officials in criminal cases.
Unlike the majority opinion which began with a discussion of rule 501,
in the concurring opinion Judge Tone premised his analysis upon the nature of
official immunity. He began by noting that state legislators derive their
immunity in the federal courts not from the speech or debate clause but from
the doctrine of official immunity. In support of this thesis he cited Tenney and
noted that this case was relied upon in subsequent United States Supreme
Court cases which granted some measure of official immunity in civil
litigation. He then referred to the nature of the speech or debate clause,
pointing to its two-pronged protections of immunity and privilege and
observing that the privilege against disclosure" is commensurate" 105 with the
immunity. Judge Tone cited Brewster1°6 and Gravel'017 in support of this
100. 528 F.2d at 779 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)) (first amendment does
not provide newspaper reporters with testimonial privilege in grand jury proceeding).
101. 528 F.2d at 779.
102. 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (restricting federal courts' power to stay or enjoin pending state court
proceedings).
103. 528 F.2d at 779.
104. Id. at 780.
105. Id.
106. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
107. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
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double protection and concluded from this development of the federal clause
that, absent an immunity, "it would be incongruous, if not useless, to
recognize an evidentiary privilege." 108
Once the concurring opinion had reasoned that no privilege exists
independent of a corresponding immunity from liability, it was unnecessary
to become immersed in an analysis of rule 501 because the existence of a
common law testimonial privilege depended upon first establishing an
immunity from liability for the particular defendant. Therefore, Judge Tone
focused on those cases adjudicating the extent of immunity which local
officials enjoy in criminal cases and cited Braatelien 109 and Anzelmo11° as
examples of the limitations of immunity in criminal suits. He also pointed to
those cases in which the federal courts enjoined state legislatures and
observed that public officials are not accorded absolute protections. 111 These
precedents led Judge Tone to conclude that "[S]tate legislators are . .
subject to federal criminal liability for analogous conduct which falls within
the prohibitions of a federal criminal statute... "112
Once this mode of analysis was adopted, the policy considerations which
had been so central to the majority opinion were dismissed as secondary in
importance to the question of when a public official is liable for criminal
conduct exercised while in public office. Judge Tone maintained that civil
immunity is "sufficient" I13 to achieve the purposes of the official immunity
doctrine, which he also acknowledged concerned legislative independence.
However, unlike the majority he agreed with the government's conclusion
that the rationale underlying the federal speech or debate clause-
congressional independence-is inapplicable when the federal government
indicts a state legislator. In support of this position he observed that the
federal clause does not include state legislators within its coverage and that
"nothing in our history" suggests a fear of unbridled federal intrusion into
state legislative activities, 114 although no authority was cited in support of this
latter proposition.
Finally, Judge Tone referred to Brewster where the Court sustained
bribery charges against a congressman. Judge Tone disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that Brewster mandates an immunity from investiga-
108. 528 F.2d at 782. The majority strongly disagreed with this conclusion, contending that
the testimonial privilege enjoyed by Congressmen "follows not from any substantive immunity
but from the Speech or Debate Clause itself." Id. at 779 n.5.
109. 147 F. Supp. 888 (8th Cir. 1945).
110. 319 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D. La. 1970).
111. See text accompanying notes 55-75 supra.
112. 528 F.2d at 783.
113. Judge Tone noted that the purpose of official immunity "is to promote independence
and fearless discharge of duty on the part of the protected officials." Id.
114. Id.
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tion into legislative motives. Although Judge Tone acknowledged that in
Brewster the prosecution did not need to inquire whether a Senator actually
fulfilled the bribe by acting accordingly in the Senate chambers, he main-
tained that the case still stands for the principle that public officials are not
immune from criminal liability for legislatively related activities. 115 There-
fore, Judge Tone implied that since state legislators do not enjoy the same
broad protections from criminal liability as do congressmen, they are not
privileged from disclosure of legislative motives in federal court. Once again,
the thesis was urged that absent a grant of immunity there is no corresponding
testimonial privilege.
Judge Tone did note that Craig had left open the question of whether the
Mail Fraud Statute and Hobbs Act do extend to sanctioning state legislative
conduct. Since Markert had not appealed this issue, the judge observed that
"[i]t would be inappropriate. . . to pass on the sufficiency of the indictment
in this interlocutory appeal of an order suppressing evidence." '116 This
comment does not underscore the important policy issues raised by the
initial motion to suppress but instead focuses on the narrower issue of
availability of the testimonial privilege.
The en banc rehearing adopted Judge Tone's analysis without much
discussion, merely reiterating the majority and concurring positions and
adopting Judge Tone's central mode of analysis. 117 The court did caution that
voting records and other legislative conduct would not alone support an
inference of criminal misconduct. 1I The judge who had written the majority
opinion maintained his views, another viewed the Illinois Speech or Debate
clause as determinative, and a third agreed with the majority opinion of the
first hearing but would have sustained the motion to suppress because Markert
did not, in his opinion, waive the privilege.
119
Although the majority opinion carefully considered the important policy
concerns and the opportunity to create a testimonial privilege under rule 501,
the final disposition of this issue and the reversal of the suppression order
resulted from the en banc court's adoption of Judge Tone's succinct analysis
of the inextricable nature of immunity and commensurate privileges. Whether
the court's final disposition of this complex issue was warranted in light of the
legal guidelines and policy considerations is the subject of the following
section.
115. Id. at 783-84.
116. Id. at 784.
117. 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir. 1976) (en bane).
118. Id. at 959.
119. Id. The United States Supreme Court rejected Markert's final appeal on this issue. 45
U.S.L.W. 3416 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976) (No. 76-179).
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Analysis of the Craig Decision
The foremost problem which Craig raises is the extent to which the
federal court could have adopted the protections of the Illinois speech or
debate clause for Markert's benefit. It is true that the federal clause does not
include state legislators within its coverage because the clause appears in
article one of the Constitution and directs its attention to the federal legislative
branch. It is also true that rule 501, particularly its Advisory Committee
notes, articulates a desire to achieve uniformity in the federal rules of
evidence and criminal procedure. Nevertheless, as several eminent scholars
have observed, 120 in adjudicating the availability of a privilege claim the
federal courts often implicitly adopt the state rule on privilege, particularly
when the state rule is in furtherance of extrinsic policy considerations. Since
the United States Supreme Court has delineated the dual nature of the federal
speech or debate clause, arguably the Illinois clause operates as a state-
created privilege as well as a grant of immunity and deserves attention in the
federal court. At a minimum, in searching for the "common law" via rule
501's directives, the state clause does present another factor which might be
considered before denying the existence of this protection.
On the other hand, as Judge Tone so precisely explained, the privilege
arose, at least in United States Supreme Court cases, only when the defendant
was able to claim an immunity. The forcefulness of Tone's legal reasoning
stems from the circular nature of this logical approach: if it is first necessary to
establish immunity, the privilege can never exist as an independent source of
legal protection. If, as Brewster establishes, taking a bribe is no part of one's
legislative duties, and if, as case law illustrates, local public officials are
criminally liable for activities of an official nature, then indeed no independ-
ent testimonial privilege surrounds a state legislator's revelations of his
motives. The difficulty raised by Tone's analysis is that there still exists the
general language of rule 501. Since no other circuit has yet confronted a claim
of this nature, the search for the federal common law only includes case law
interpreting the federal clause with respect to congressmen.
Therefore, it seems unavoidable that the question of comity is inherently
important in the Craig factual situation and the problem really becomes one
of determining at what point the federal courts must defer to the states'
concern for intra-governmental independence. 121 In recent cases 122 the Court
120. See Orfield, Privileges in Federal Criminal Evidence, 40 U. DET. L. REV. 403, 411-13
(1963); Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of Federal Rules of
Evidence, 69 COL. L. REV. 353, 370-73 (1969).
121. When the issue before the court is admissibility of evidence, diverse opinions have been
expressed as to the deference accorded state law. One view is expressed by Professor Weinstein
as follows: "As the spectrum shifts from overriding federal to overriding state policy, we can
expect the rule on recognition of state privilege to shift. Thus, in criminal cases, the federal law of
exclusion and admission controls." Weinstein, Recbgnition in the United States of the Privileges
of Another Jurisdiction, 56 COL. L. REV. 535,547 (1956). Professor Louisell stresses recognition
of principles of comity:
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has manifested an increasing trend to defer to the statutes and case law of the
states on matters of local governmental concern. In NationalLeague of Cities
v. Usery, 123 the Court held that the federal government could not impose
minimum wage and maximum hour provisions upon state and local govern-
mental units. In this important decision the majority ruled that such a
requirement would "directly displace the state's freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.''124 Thus, the
majority's explicit attention to the importance of state sovereignty in local
government functions indicates the Court's present leanings and the analogy
to the Craig fact pattern is readily apparent. 125 Perhaps if the arguments in
Markert's behalf had stressed this aspect of the case, with sufficient preceden-
tial support, the attention of the en banc court would have been diverted from
Markert's personal position to the needs of the Illinois General Assembly to
regulate its own internal affairs. It appears that general reiterations of "the
nature" of the states in the federal system was not persuasive.
Finally, Craig raises, as Judge Tone and the en banc panel noted, the
important question of the extent to which zealous prosecutors may or should
pursue delinquent local officials. The allegations of the Craig indictment
reveal a sordid scheme of misuse of the powers of public office for personal
gain. Although a sense of justice may welcome the disposition reached in
Craig, in considering the effect of this evidentiary ruling, concern for the
future extent of investigations into the state legislature remains. In Craig the
defendant had personally provided the controverted statements. However,
Craig leaves open the question of whether statements made on the floor of the
Illinois General Assembly, in committee meetings, and in other legislative
settings, would be introduced in federal criminal litigation. Needless to say,
although Judge Tone offered assurances that United States history does not
reveal excessive federal interference with state legislative independence,126
the future turn of events remains to be seen.
Thus, the differing viewpoints of the majority and concurring opinions at
The privileges are institutions of the states in no way inharmonious with controlling
federal standards; to the contrary some of them at least may ultimately have federal
constitutional status. They represent substantive rights protected in the holder by the
power competent in our federal system to protect such rights. Of course in any criminal
prosecution it may be to the great convenience of the federal government to ignore a
privilege, as it may be to ignore other state institutions. But this does not make it right
to do so.
Louisell, supra note 84, at 123-24.
122. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976) (state law interpretation that allegedly
permanent public employee can be removed without hearing prevails in federal court); Kelley v.
Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (county hair-grooming regulation for police officers upheld).
123. 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
124. Id. at 2474.
125. Id. at 2470-71.
126. 528 F.2d at 783.
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the first appellate hearing illustrate the numerous policy considerations which
must be weighed in creating a testimonial privilege. In light of the limitations
upon official immunity for local officials in federal criminal cases and the
concurring opinion's logical analysis of the nature of a speech or debate
privilege, it appears that the concurring opinion is technically more persua-
sive. However, if this litigation had occurred in the state court, clearly
Markert's admissions would have been protected by his state constitutional
rights.
CONCLUSION
In this case of first impression, the Seventh Circuit decided that
state legislators are not afforded a common law testimonial privilege when
they have provided federal officials with statements concerning their legisla-
tive conduct. Because Markert was subject to criminal liability for receiving a
bribe after manipulating passage of a house bill, he was ultimately denied the
protections which his motion to suppress would have provided and was
eventually convicted in the trial court.
The immediate effect of Craig will undoubtedly be a reluctance on the
part of wayward state legislators in the Seventh Circuit to provide federal
officials with extensive discourse on the motives and conduct underlying their
legislative activities. Whether the long range effect of this evidentiary ruling
will result in chilling other state legislators from discussing their official acts
remains to be seen.
The Seventh Circuit, however, has explicitly articulated its position that
in cases of local political corruption, state legislators are not automatically
granted additional privileges on the basis of their political position. In an era
replete with disappointing displays of abuse of public office, the Seventh
Circuit has at a minimum established that in resolving evidentiary and
procedural issues, the status of the defendant is not of paramount importance.
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